Why Trump Is Going All In to Please Erdogan
Donald Trump’s posture toward Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of this week’s NATO summit in Ankara has been striking even by Trump’s own standards. He has praised the Turkish leader as a “hell of a leader” and a good friend, floated reversing a seven-year-old ban on F-35 sales to Turkey, and pushed a $700 million-plus jet engine deal through over bipartisan objections on Capitol Hill. None of this is happening in a vacuum, and the reasons behind it say as much about Trump’s own instincts as they do about Erdogan’s skill in exploiting them.
Personal chemistry, not institutional alignment
The two men operate the same way: both prefer personal deal-making over deliberative process, and both have shown a preference for imposing their own read on foreign policy rather than working through career diplomats or legislative consensus. Trump has been candid that his attendance in Ankara came down to a personal ask from Erdogan rather than any structural NATO obligation, describing a phone call in which Erdogan pressed him directly to show up. That kind of direct, informal channel of influence is exactly the terrain where Erdogan operates best, and exactly the terrain Trump tends to reward.
Turkey’s leverage as convener
Erdogan understood something useful going into this summit: Trump’s absence would have been read as a serious blow to alliance cohesion, especially at a moment when Trump has repeatedly floated pulling US forces back from Europe. By securing Trump’s attendance through a personal appeal, Erdogan effectively made himself indispensable to the optics of the summit succeeding. That gives Turkey outsized standing relative to other NATO members who have spent years keeping Ankara at arm’s length over its S-400 purchase, its operations against Kurdish forces in Syria, and its earlier stalling of Sweden’s accession.
Syria, Gaza, and a widening cooperation track
Beyond the summit stagecraft, Erdogan and Trump have built a working relationship on issues far outside NATO’s traditional scope. Regular calls between the two have covered Syria and the Gaza ceasefire framework, with Turkey folded into the Board of Peace structure overseeing that ceasefire. Trump has also credited Erdogan with keeping Turkey out of the Iran conflict at his request, an account that reinforces the sense of Erdogan as a partner Trump can call on and rely on to follow through. That track record of cooperation on the Middle East file appears to be buying Erdogan real goodwill that spills over into the defense relationship.
Where Israel fits into the calculation
This is where the recalibration becomes most visible. Trump has openly praised Erdogan while standing next to Benjamin Netanyahu, and has reportedly urged the Israeli prime minister to be more accommodating of Turkish influence in Syria rather than pushing back on it. Netanyahu’s own objections to a Turkish F-35 sale, framed around preserving Israel’s regional air superiority, have not visibly moved Trump off the idea. That’s a notable shift from the dynamic under the Biden administration, which kept a more critical distance from Ankara and gave Israel a more sympathetic hearing on Turkish influence in Syria.
The defense industry angle
There’s a harder material logic underneath the personal rapport as well. The F-110 engine sale is tied to Turkey’s domestically built KAAN fighter program, giving Ankara a path to fifth-generation capability with or without American cooperation. Facilitating that deal, and dangling the possibility of F-35 reinstatement on top of it, gives Washington a way to keep Turkey’s defense industry tied to American suppliers rather than pushing Ankara further toward independent or Russian-sourced alternatives. Vice President Vance’s framing at the Oval Office meeting, that any F-35 sale would only proceed once Turkey demonstrably complies with U.S. law, suggests the administration is aware it needs some legal cover even as it works to get there.
The limits nobody has resolved
None of this changes the legal reality sitting underneath all the warmth. The statutory bar on F-35 sales tied to Turkey’s retention of the Russian S-400 system remains in force, and influential Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have made clear they intend to fight any reinstatement. Trump can extend as much goodwill as he likes in Ankara this week, but converting that goodwill into an actual F-35 delivery still runs through a Congress that has not moved nearly as far toward Turkey as the executive branch has.
The likeliest read is that Trump’s affinity for Erdogan reflects a broader pattern rather than anything specific to Turkey: a documented preference for strongman leaders and personal loyalty over institutional friction, paired with real strategic incentives around Syria, Gaza, and keeping Turkish defense procurement inside the American orbit. Erdogan has read that pattern accurately and is extracting as much as the relationship will bear.